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Introduction: Between
Acknowledgment and Avoidance
RICHARD ELDRIDGE

In an early essay, Stanley Cavell writes that the problem of the ordinary
language philosopher – a problem from which he himself takes his bearings –
is “to discover the speciﬁc plight of mind and circumstance within which a
human being gives voice to his condition.”1 What can this mean? What
is a plight of mind and circumstance? How does giving voice constitute a
response and address to a general human condition that is instanced in
a speciﬁc way?
Since it is a plight of mind that is in question, it is already evident that
Cavell must be concerned with something more than simply a physical or
biological state of being a human being, even if the mind is itself inextricably
lodged in both bodily and cultural circumstances. Nor is the problem of giving voice simply that of unburdening oneself of an idiosyncratic emotion:
giving voice implies not brute discharge alone, but further a making intelligible of how the human condition is present in one who has been moved
to speak. Nor will just any speech do; giving voice implies an achievement
of expressiveness that is beyond the communication of bits of information
about the material world.
Instead, to be moved to give voice to a plight of mind and circumstance –
to manage that achievement – is to express a speciﬁc sense of just how, here
and now, one’s human capacities for free and ﬂuent voicing and action are
somehow both enabled and inhibited by one’s culture and one’s life with
others as they stand. One seeks, as Cavell elsewhere puts it, “freedom of
consciousness, the beginning of freedom, . . . freedom of language, having
the run of it, as if successfully claimed from it, as of a birthright.”2 One
seeks to have one’s performances – one’s uses of concepts in thought, in
utterance, and in action, which are all internally related – be both one’s own
as expressions of one’s independent personality and desire, against the sways
of the common, and reasonably endorsable, by both others and oneself, as
valuable expressions of common possibilities and necessities.
This is no small task, and Cavell emphasizes the persistence of the effort
to achieve such expressiveness, as against both simpler, dogmatic recipes
1
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for its achievement and (what he sees as) naturalist-quietist scantings of
the adventure of the human. Rather than sketching and defending any
deﬁnite account of human ﬂourishing, Cavell notes that there are certain
“arguments that must not be won” and that philosophy might be conceived
of as “the achievement of the unpolemical, of the refusal to take sides in
metaphysical positions.”3
This is not a refusal to take sides or to enact commitments as such, but
rather “a refusal of, say, disobedient to, (a false) ascent, or transcendence”4
as a ground of commitment. Against false ascent, Cavell poses philosophy
as descent, the necessary faithfulness of philosophy to the common and the
ordinary, as the only available loci of repertoires of language, thought, conceptual life, and human action. But it is also true that “the (actual) everyday
[is – or can be experienced as, for Cavell, following Wittgenstein – ] . . .
a scene of illusion and trance and artiﬁciality (of need).”5 Philosophy as ascent
is also called for. Hence what is pursued, in and through the pursuit of
fully expressive action, aiming at exemplariness of voicing, is an eventual or
transﬁgured ordinary, a ﬁt common habitation for the human.
Since, however, one takes one’s own bearings and possibilities of
thought, action, and expression from within the ordinary as it stands, as
a scene of both possibilities and (false) necessities, of both affordances and
inhibitions, it follows that philosophizing, the effort to enact more humanly
expressive possibilities, will be “a spiritual struggle, speciﬁcally a struggle
with the contrary depths of oneself.”6 One will ﬁnd oneself, at times, pursuing a thought, vision, or course of action that is not generally shared, hence
seeking abandonment of or departure from the common. But then one will
also ﬁnd oneself, at times, recoiling from the solipsistic madness of apocalyptic vision and returning to the common, accepting it as cure.7 Neither
movement, in Cavell’s perception, can be complete or ﬁnal. What is left,
to adapt Dieter Henrich’s useful characterization of Friedrich Hölderlin’s
stance, is the thought “that conscious life is at once shaped and unbalanced
by the basic conﬂicting tendencies orienting it. And the formative process
of life aims at ﬁnding a balance and a harmony amidst this strife, in which
no one tendency is entirely suppressed or denied in its own right.”8 For
Cavell, as for Hölderlin, these conﬂicting basic tendencies include at least
the pursuit of independent selfhood and the pursuit of communion, community, love, and the common. Seeking both, one is left between avoidance
(of others, of the common, of what is common with others in oneself, as
decayed, vulgarized, inhibiting, and empty) and acknowledgment (of others,
of the common, of what is common with others in oneself, as what alone
enables thought, recovery, conversation, and restoration).
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To ﬁnd oneself in such a plight is, in Cavell’s reading, central to what it
is to be “a creature complicated or burdened enough to possess language
at all.”9 Not everyone will feel or accept this, will feel or accept the burden
or complication of seeking expressive freedom and the run of language,
thought, and action. The demands of daily life or of sheer survival are too
pressing for some to notice this plight; others are reasonably distracted
by scientiﬁc, political, artistic, intellectual, and other problems that are
genuinely absorbing. But then it is also true that these problems themselves
may include problems of human aspiration that touch on this plight of mind,
that those who are pressed or absorbed in daily life may suffer from quiet
desperation, silent melancholy, or distractedness, all covertly legible in their
pursuits and entertainments, and that in certain nights of the soul a sense
of this plight may come to consciousness, even if it is then often reasonably
suppressed in the name of decency, work, or common life.
We come to language as something that is already there before us in the
practices of our elders. The criteria for calling something what it is are there
in practice before we are, and we cannot come to thought and linguistic
practice without them. This fact has both positive and negative sides. “I have
to accept [criteria], use them,” if I am to enter into linguistic and conceptual
practice at all, but “this itself makes my use of them seem arbitrary, or
private – as though they were never shared, or as if our sharing of them
is either a fantastic accident or a kind of mass folly.”10 Their presence and
availability in practice are not grounded for me in any kind of unmediated
knowledge of ultimate realities and of the relation of words to them. If
words and the criteria for their use then seem ungrounded or arbitrary,
I can feel my own dawning powers in their exercise to be uncertain. My
exercise of these powers may seem liable to drift away from others’ and
then to repudiation, and I can wish to do better. I can indulge in a fantasy
of absolute power in my uses of (to me) primitive words, fully grounded in
necessarily private acts of inner “recognition.” Or I can indulge in a fantasy
of powerlessness or “necessary inexpressiveness,”11 in which my uses of
words occur “according to laws of nature” in and through me, without
implicating me in responsibility for their ﬁnding or missing understanding
in any audience.
Yet these fantasies of cognitive omnipotence and of necessary inexpressiveness come to nothing, can’t be worked out. “We cannot really imagine . . . , or rather . . . there is nothing of the sort to imagine, or rather . . .
when we as it were try to imagine this we are imagining something other
than we think.”12 The discovery of either private, perfect, absolute “inner
recognitions” or fully law-governed natural processes in me cannot be stated
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within ordinary language without returning us to the very scene of risks and
responsibilities we had sought to escape. Ordinary criteria “are the terms
in which I relate what’s happening,”13 and I must draw on them if I am to
think and speak at all. This is not to deny that there can be innovations
in language in the form of new technical terms or new turns of metaphor.
It is to deny that language as such could have such bases in individual acts
or events apart from the common. Public words and the criteria for their
use are there before us, and they are the only things we have to go on. In
Stephen Mulhall’s useful summary, Cavell’s thought is that
if the ground of the inheritability of language, the basis of the continued existence of the speech community and its members, is the capacity of human
beings to see and hear themselves in the words and deeds of other human
beings, then the continuance of that community cannot be guaranteed either by nature or by grammar; it rests solely upon our capacity to take and
maintain an interest in one another and in ourselves.14

Though we can succeed in taking and maintaining such an interest, we
can also fail, and we can feel the responsibility for success or failure to be
an undue burden. Hence we live, in Cavell’s perception, in simultaneous
satisfaction with and disappointment in criteria and the ordinary,15 engaged
in “a continuous effort at balance,”16 between escape into independence and
personal assertion, on the one hand, and return to accommodation, habit,
and domestication on the other. The reason for this joint disappointment
and satisfaction is that there is within us “the human drive to transcend itself,
make itself inhuman.”17 “Nothing could be more human” than “the power
of the motive to reject the human,”18 than to seek somehow – whether in
perfect individual cognitive omnipotence (even if within a narrow domain)
or in perfect submission to the ordinary and natural – to perfect one’s
satisfactions and overcome one’s disappointments. “The threat, or the truth,
of skepticism [is] that it names our wish (and the possibility of our wishing)
to strip ourselves of the responsibility we have in meaning (or in failing to
mean) one thing, or one way, rather than another.”19 There is inherent in
the human and “inherent in philosophy a certain drive to the inhuman . . .
[that is] somehow itself the most inescapably human of motivations.”20
For beings who are freighted with such wishes and responsibilities, arising in and through engagement with the ordinary, the ordinary itself is, in
a phrasing Cavell adapts from Heidegger, “at bottom . . . not ordinary; it is
extra-ordinary, uncanny.”21 For Cavell, “the uncanniness of the ordinary is
epitomized by . . . the capacity, even the desire, of ordinary language [that
is, of we who use it] to repudiate itself.”22 Nothing within ordinary thinking
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or linguistic practice guarantees its continuation; how it goes on is up to us,
we who are initiated into it and go on within and from it, and this can seem
terrifying. Yet ordinary thinking and linguistic practice are necessary media
for the presence of things to discursively thinking, judgmental subjects, and
we do not have the power to alter prior patterns of language and thought
tout court. These patterns have a certain sway over us, and this too can
seem terrifying. Both “the repudiation of the world” as a scene of perhaps
false necessities, and of perennial risks, and “its revelation of the world” are
“internal to” ordinary language.23 As discursive, acting, judging subjects,
we wish for more – more mastery, more grounding, more surety – from the
ordinary. Yet the ordinary (together with its possible successors) remains
the only scene for our lives as such subjects. We are hence in relation to
the ordinary both at home and not at home; it is uncanny. “The human
necessity of the quest for home and the human fact of immigrancy are seen
together as aspects of the human as such.”24
Inhabiting our relation to the ordinary, therefore, are opposed drives toward both its acceptance and its overcoming. The ordinary and our relation
to it in turn enable – and may even present themselves as requiring – the
working out of both drives. It is possible, and sometimes necessary if solipsistic madness is to be foregone and thought and reasonable action are to be
continued at all, to consent “to become intelligible.”25 Acknowledgment of
the common – both the current common and the perfected common that
can arise out of it alone – is possible. To refuse that acknowledgment altogether and instead to insist on pure independence of thought is to fall
into skepticism not as insinuating possibility, but as mad discovery, or to
fall even further into the all-too-human avoidances and rages of Othello
and Lear. In Wittgenstein’s phrasing, “Knowledge is in the end based on
acknowledgment”26 of the common, of what is among us. Acknowledgment
is available, and there is no thought or reasonable action without it. Even
genius, whatever departures from the common it enacts in an exemplary
way, must be “the name of the promise that the private and the social will
be achieved together,”27 that a perfected ordinary will be the site of return
and redemption. The remarrying pairs canvassed in Pursuits of Happiness 28
arrive at such an achievement, and it is – sometimes – a genuine possibility
of signiﬁcance for us.
But then too a certain avoidance – what Cavell, following Emerson,
calls “aversiveness” or “daring to say”29 – is also possible and sometimes
necessary. “Emerson calls the mode of uncreated life,” in which we are
dominated by a fallen social world and seem to ourselves not to be authors
of our lives, “ ‘conformity.’ . . . Each of the modern prophets [ – Cavell lists
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Mill, Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud as well as Emerson – ] seems to have
been driven to ﬁnd some way of characterizing the threat to individual
existence, to individuation, posed by the life to which their society is
bringing itself.”30 In the face of such threats, there are times to be “the one
who goes ﬁrst”31 to reﬁgure what the ordinary might better be. In either
case, in moments of either acknowledgment or avoidance on the path of
thinking,
[w]hat I require is a convening of my culture’s criteria, in order to confront
them with my words and life as I pursue them and as I may imagine them;
and at the same time to confront my words and life as I pursue them with
the life my culture’s words may imagine for me: to confront the culture with
itself, along the lines in which it meets in me.
This seems to me a task that warrants the name of philosophy.32

To undertake the task of philosophy is then to attempt to speak, in a
phrase of Kant’s that Cavell adapts to describe the efforts of both the critic of
the arts and the ordinary language philosopher, “with a universal voice.”33
Centrally, this attempt will take the form of making what Cavell calls a
claim of reason, a claim about what our criteria are. One will ﬁnd oneself
saying what we would say when: “this is what we call an accident as opposed
to a mistake, or this is what we call justice, or love, or knowledge.” Such
claims of reason are lodged as reminders and vehicles of reorientation –
to and on behalf of both others and oneself – when the applications of
the concepts expressed by these words are somehow both dimly available
and yet attenuated or disputed. As Wittgenstein puts it, “When I think
away the normal language-game with the expression . . ., then I need a
criterion of identity for it.”34 Such utterances are claims all at once to selfknowledge (of what one would say when), to community (to what we would
say when), and to reason (to what it makes sense to say when).35 “The
philosophical appeal to what we say, and the search for our criteria on the
basis of which we say what we say, are claims to community. And the claim
to community is always a search for the basis upon which it can [be] or has
been established. . . . The wish and search for community are the wish and
search for reason.”36
Such claims to reason that embody efforts at reorientation of both self
and community are distinctive of philosophy and philosophical criticism:
the heirs, one might say, of necessary truths as constituting what is distinctive about philosophy. Unlike, however, necessary truths as traditionally conceived – that is, as objects of a ﬁxed intellectual discovery that
is always ratiﬁable by anyone – these claims, for Cavell, can fail in their
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inherent aim of reﬁguring rational community. “It may prove to be the case
that I am wrong [in making such a claim], that my conviction isolates me
from all others, from myself.”37 This is a standing risk for the modernist
philosopher – afﬁliated with the modernist artist’s risk of fraudulence in
seeking new routes of artistic work38 – as one who lives in a modern community “in which history and its conventions can no longer be taken for
granted,”39 if they ever quite wholly could.
But such claims can also succeed, as Austin’s treatments of accidents
versus mistakes and losing control of oneself versus succumbing to temptation perhaps above all demonstrate. We can then ﬁnd ourselves, with
ourselves and one another, possessing our own criteria and knowing what
we would say when. The magic of philosophy (and of art) lies in the achievement of this reorientation in practice, where and when it can be achieved,
and in acceptance of the thought that here or there it will, always, have
to be reachieved again. Without their relation to subjectivity, its standing possibilities of disorientation and inexpressiveness, its standing risks of
fraudulence and trust,
art and the criticism of art [ – and, given the analogies, philosophy and the
criticism of philosophy – ] would not have their special importance nor elicit
their own forms of distrust and gratitude. The problem of the critic, as of
the artist [ – and the philosopher (of a certain kind) – ], is not to discount his
subjectivity [ – and need for new routes of expressiveness and perception – ]
but to include it; not to overcome it in agreement, but to master it in
exemplary ways. Then his work outlasts the fashions and arguments of a
particular age. That is the beauty of it.40

In a justly famous, perhaps even notorious, passage at the end of the
opening section of Chapter 4, “Self-Consciousness,” of The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel writes that we have reached a great “turning point.”
Our thinking about who and what we are at this point “leaves behind it
the colourful show of the sensuous here-and-now and the nightlike void of
the supersensible beyond, and steps out into the spiritual daylight of the
present.”41 What this turning point turns out to involve, very roughly, is the
absorption of essentially epistemological questions by essentially political,
historical, artistic, and religious questions. Allowing for the foreignness of
the idiom, in Chapters 1, 2, and 3 of the Phenomenology the topics are all
ones that would be familiar to contemporary analytic epistemologists and
philosophers of mind. How do we apprehend particulars? What is the experience of qualia? In what ways might our consciousness of objects be lawgoverned? Beginning with Chapter 4, however, things are very different.
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The topics now center around forms of worldly practice in pursuit of the
public satisfaction of desire. What is it to live freely? How might agents
achieve recognition? What political institutions, forms of art, and religious
conceptions that have been developed historically will help us to live freely
and to achieve recognition?
Hegel’s argument in moving from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4 is that answering the latter set of questions will settle all the epistemological problems
that were raised in the ﬁrst three chapters, and that nothing else will. But
that stretch of argument – the treatment of “Force and the Understanding”
and then of “life” – is as notoriously obscure and difﬁcult as anything Hegel
ever wrote.
So is the absorption of the epistemological by the practical a good idea?
Ignoring Hegel’s own argument, there are considerations that point both
ways, and it is at least possible to understand contemporary analytic philosophy and contemporary Continental philosophy as taking one of these
sets of considerations to have decisive force against the other.
In favor of the practical turn, it might be said that our knowing and our
epistemological inquiries into the nature of our knowing arise only when
we have already managed some cognitive successes and then begun to
reﬂect on the differences between cognitive success and failure. That reﬂection must involve historical awareness of alternatives, and it must itself
be supported by a certain amount of leisure for reﬂection, over and above
a continuous struggle for bare subsistence. Hence knowing and reﬂection
on knowing seem to take place within historical and practical contexts in
which people – embodied human agents, with social relations and social
interests – are already trying to do something. Much of Continental philosophy since Hegel has been centrally interested in the histories of human
cognitive and social practices, taking it for granted that these practices
are deeply interrelated. Satisfaction of our aims – including our cognitive
aims – if it is to be achieved must be at least in part also a social and practical
achievement.
Against the practical turn, it might be said that language, culture, and
sociopolitical life – at least in the richly articulated forms in which we humans have them – are all species-speciﬁc. Other animals just don’t do what
we do, linguistically, cognitively, or sociopolitically. If we are the linguistic,
cultural, and political animals that we are, this must somehow be because
we are the mind/brain endowed animals we are. Surely, further, we have
succeeded in knowing some things about our environment by taking in objects in the right way and doing so independently of and often in the face of
any political developments. Mathematics and modern scientiﬁc knowledge
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may be evolving and contested, but they are at least more independent of
political considerations than are other regions of cultural life. The science
and mathematics of China and the United States look a lot more alike than
do their paintings or politics or religious rituals. Surely it is reasonable to
try to give some culture-independent account of at least our most basic
cognitive achievements. Perhaps it is best to leave political philosophy on
its own as a set of problems of social organization, without tendentious,
quasi-religious essentialisms: political, not metaphysical. Much of contemporary analytic epistemology and philosophy of mind and language has
been centrally interested in explaining the roots of culture in given human
endowments and in characterizing our cognitive successes by reference to
our species-speciﬁc powers.
Rough and tendentious though these sketches of argument are, and
granting that there are numbers of interesting and important philosophers
who are working somehow between them, these two paradigms do map two
large and largely divergent routes of current philosophical imagination. For
Cavell, by contrast, the argument between these two paradigms is centrally
one of those that cannot and must not be won. Our practical and cognitive
lives are intertwined – it is no accident that one of Cavell’s central terms,
acknowledgment, is a transcription of Hegel’s Anerkennung – but neither full
satisfaction in shared social practices nor full and self-standing absolute
knowing of ‘the’ way things are, free of practical commitment and risk, is
possible. In both social and cognitive practice, there are always resistances
and remainders, both socially and within oneself. These resistances and
remainders will call for and enable departures from what is already done,
either cognitively or socially. New regions of interest and ways of pursuing
them will emerge out of them, and these will have to be and can (sometimes)
be articulated on behalf of a more perfect ordinary. Investigation into how
individuals, by drawing on the capacities of the species, manage this feat
will always be invited. Yet these regions of interest and ways of pursuing
them can establish their sense – for oneself as well as for others – only
insofar as they are acknowledged: taken up and lived out, yet also setting up
their own resistances and remainders. We live between acknowledgment
and avoidance.
To come to discursive consciousness of self in relation to a set of existent and evolving practices, together with their distinctive resistances and
remainders, is to participate, in Cavell’s formulation, in “a self’s judgmental
forming of itself, as something to be further possessed or to be overcome.”42
One seeks unity with oneself and in relation to others in secure mastery of fully reasonable practice – sometimes through acknowledgment by
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accepting the ordinary and one’s legibility within it; sometimes through
departure, daring to say, and gesturing toward an eventual, more perfect
ordinary. Yet there is no escape from this seeking into either absolute knowing or absolute freedom.
Hence, in living within this condition – timidly or boldly; gracefully
or assertively; cleverly, decently, or badly – “each life is exemplary of all,
a parable of each; that is humanity’s commonness, which is internal to
its endless denials of commonness.”43 To think philosophically about this
condition, refusing either its abandonment or its absolute cure, in any region
of practice, will be also to participate in it, in one way or another. It will
involve aligning one’s life and pursuits both with and against other lives and
pursuits, as one moves oneself between acknowledgment and avoidance.
Central to such alignments will be philosophizing as the work of reading:44
hence Cavell’s endless ﬁnding of aspects of himself, and of oppositions
to himself, in Plato, Descartes, Emerson, Nietzsche, Luther, Rousseau,
Wittgenstein, Poe, Shakespeare, Verdi, Hawks, and Capra. In these thinkers
and in their works (and in others, without end), Cavell ﬁnds exemplary
ways of responding to our “continuing task”45 of ﬁnding and enacting our
freedom, of “guiding the soul, or self, [together with its practices] from selfimprisonment toward the light or the instinct of freedom.”46 Such ﬁndings
and enactments, or such routes of self-creation, imply that in taking them
up we both could and “would have to accept responsibility for ourselves, in
particular have to consent to our present state as something we desire, or
anyway desire more than we desire change,”47 if we are to ﬁnd satisfaction
within them. This possibility and burden might, Cavell notes, further drive
one mad, perhaps into Othello’s or Lear’s region of avoidance and of the
refusal of legibility: anything but to have to consent again, and yet again,
to the ordinary as it stands. Or this possibility and burden might, as in
the remarryings of the pairs considered in Pursuits of Happiness, enable and
motivate acknowledgment and a certain consent to one’s state, where these
might further sustain their own reachievement in a ﬁt enough ordinary,
experienced as these paired individuals’ daily wit and romance with one
another.
When each life is thus seen as a parable of each, whether exemplary or
admonitory, there will be no single perfect way of human life, individual
or social, even while possibilities of further perfection make themselves
available and haunt us. Hence philosophers’ “solutions” to “problems” –
whether of knowing or of social life – will present themselves not so much
or so centrally as “answers” to be accepted or rejected, but as bound up with
available styles of response – all of them partial, some of them exemplary
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or admonitory – to the condition of the human, styles themselves legible
as involving both acknowledgment and avoidance. What would it be to
deny that human life and mindedness should be so seen? Is such a denial
quite coherently possible? Cavell’s articulation of the human would imply
that it is not. Through the work of reading, carried out in relation to life,
this articulation can sustain itself as encompassing, generous, perceptive,
nuanced, and deep, as ﬁtly so as any it is possible to imagine. In this it offers
a style of philosophical thinking – the reading of each life as a parable of
each – that may well stand comparison with the visions of the human of the
analytic and Continental traditions, or of any of the other visionaries upon
whom Cavell has touched. One will have to read to see.
The contributors to this volume were asked to address Cavell’s work in
relation to some more or less standard subﬁelds in philosophy and to
some not so standard. Taken in order, they are ethics; the theory of action; the philosophy of mind and language; aesthetics and modernism;
Romanticism and German Idealism; American philosophy and the idea of
America; Shakespeare; and movies, opera, and the problem of voice. As each
contributor is at pains to make clear, however, the sense of what the topic or
problem at hand is is quite often deeply transﬁgured by Cavell’s handling of
it, as that handling draws upon his larger vision of the human. Hence readers
of this volume will ﬁnd essays that begin with sketches of more or less standard problems or readings and then go on to show how in Cavell’s hands
mindedness, performativity, ethics, aesthetics, poetry, drama, citizenship,
and movies inform and draw on one another. The pleasures and insights of
following these handlings are in the end the best argument – inseparable
from reading, from criticism, from exempliﬁcation, and from invitation –
on behalf of Cavell’s account of the human.
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